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 The Obama Administration and US Trade Representative Kirk’s’ intentions to 
consider the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement in the near future is of great concern to 
the International Labor Rights Forum. President Obama’s requirement that the 
Colombian government meet a set of benchmarks to curb trade union murders and 
otherwise address serious labor rights violations before entering into an agreement, 
assumes that Colombia’s government is on a path toward ending such systematic 
violence.  Such a consideration overlooks the Colombian government’s structural deficits 
reflected in its ongoing failures to uphold the rule of law, progress towards civilian 
control of society, eliminate government corruption and create an unbiased, functional 
criminal justice system. The Administration should not make the mistake of assuming 
that the immense problems of Colombia can be changed within the period of one 
Congress -- two years. Indications of serious change in controlling the factors that lead to 
labor homicides must be measured over a sustained period of time through verifiable 
evidence. The ILRF cautions that moving forward to promote trade in a country such as 
Colombia without such evidence firmly in place signals that US commercial interests are 
more important than ending Colombia’s egregious human rights violations.   
 
 
Violence Against Union Leaders 
 
Uribe defenders point to the decline in the number of trade unionists murdered in 
Colombia, dropping from 94 killed in 2003 (Uribe’s first full year in office) to 39 in 
2007. But trade union murders rose again to 49 in 2008 and less than four months into 
2009, 17 trade unionists have already been murdered, raising questions over the measure 
of progress over the last 3 years.1 The reality is that since Uribe took office, more trade 
unionists have been murdered in Colombia than in the rest of the world combined.2 
Paramilitary groups, many with ties to former Colombian Government and military 
officials, have largely been responsible for such murders. 
                                                 
1 USLEAP, “Colombia Fact Sheet” March 2009, 
http://www.usleap.org/files/Impunity%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf, “Assasinations Continue in Colombia,” ITUC 
Press Release, May 12, 2009 
2 USLEAP, “Colombia Fact Sheet”, April 2008, Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de las y los 
Sindicalistas Colombianos, January 1 to December 31, 2007, Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), March 
2008, p. 30, and Annual Surveys of Violations of Trade Union Rights, International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC). ITUC annual surveys are available online at http://survey07.ituc-
csi.org/getcontinent.php?IDContinent=0&IDLang=EN. 
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In addition, beyond debates over the sheer number of murders, other forms of violence 
and threats on the workers rights to organize have increased. According to the Escuela 
Nacional Sindical, a prominent Colombian organization dedicated to researching trade 
union issues, after 2003, “there was a strategic change in the forms of violence against 
unionized workers, which can be principally characterized by a decrease in homicides, 
the accelerated increase in detentions, the increase in violations of the human rights of 
women unionists, the powerful restrictions to union freedoms, a significant increase in 
death threats, the increase in crimes committed by State actors, and the use of a variety of 
strategies to disguise the magnitude of the violence.”3  
 
Corruption and Impunity 
 
In addition to current violence, little progress has been made in addressing the impunity 
enjoyed by the perpetrators of past and present labor homicides. The majority of the 
2,700 labor homicides that have occurred since 1986 have gone unprosecuted and 
uninvestigated. The impunity rate remains at 96.7% and not a single intellectual author of 
a trade union homicide has been convicted.4 Impunity will persist unless the Government 
of Colombia prioritizes the investigation and prosecution of those who ordered, planned, 
or paid for the hired assassins responsible for the physical acts of violence .  
 
In February 2007, Jorge Noguera, Colombia’s former intelligence chief, was indicted for 
helping violent right-wing paramilitaries to infiltrate high levels of the Colombian 
Government. In September, 2008, General Mario Montoya Uribe, the leader of 
Colombia’s army was accused in legal testimony of working closely with paramilitaries 
and funneling weapons to key paramilitary commanders.5 In late April 2009, a retired 
lieutenant colonel and seven other soldiers were arrested for the killings of two civilians 
who they allegedly presented as guerrillas slain in combat to inflate rebel body counts.6 
None of these cases have yet been resolved within Colombia’s judicial system.  These are 
just a few examples of the strong ties existing between Colombia’s military personnel 
and the paramilitaries responsible for murdering thousands of trade unionists.  
 
In a notorious “Parapolitics” scandal, the Colombian Supreme Court indicted almost 30 
members of the Colombian Congress for colluding with the right-wing “AUC” 
paramilitary group, considered to be a terrorist organization by the US Department of 
State. Again there is not yet sufficient evidence to indicate how Colombia’s judicial 
system will handle such cases.  Continued investigation and prosecution of such cases 
                                                 
3 5 “Cuaderno de Derechos Humanos No. 19, 2515 Or that Sinister Ease to Forget: 21 Years of Systematic 
and Selective Assassinations (1986-2006).” 2007 p 54, 
http://www.ens.org.co/publicacion.htm?x=20152686 
4 Human Rights Watch quoting Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) records at Feb. 12, 2009 House 
hearing. 
5 See USLEAP, “Colombia Fact Sheet”, March 2009 
http://www.usleap.org/files/Impunity%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf 
6 “Colombia soldiers charged in civilians' killings,” May 1, 2009, Associated Press 
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will take far more than the two years or less Obama has suggested for Colombia to meet 
human rights benchmarks.   
 
The Uribe administration through much of its tenure, showed little interest in prosecuting 
human rights violations. According to Human Rights Watch’s 2009 report, “Until very 
recently, not only the paramilitaries, but also their accomplices, have consistently been 
able to avoid investigation, prosecution, and punishment. many of the cases [taken up by 
the special Human Rights Unit] were stalled or closed after the appointment in 2001 of 
Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio, who purged the office of officials who had worked 
on sensitive human rights cases and sent a clear message to those who remained that 
efforts to prosecute human rights violations committed by army officers would not be 
welcome.”7 
 
According to a Human Rights Watch, the Uribe Administration has also attempted to 
strip the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over such “parapolitics” cases involving 
indicted members of Congress.. “ [Uribe] has repeatedly launched public personal attacks 
on the Supreme Court and its members in what increasingly looks like a concerted 
campaign to smear and discredit the Court..opposed and effectively blocked meaningful 
efforts to reform the Congress to eliminate paramilitary influence…and proposed 
constitutional reforms that would remove the "parapolitics" investigations from the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”8  In addition, the specialized criminal judge, José 
Nirio Sánchez, who was appointed to prosecute many of the above “parapolitics” cases 
was pushed out by the Uribe Administration and replaced in January 12, 2008 after 
serving the Colombian government for 35 years.9 Such behavior by the Uribe 
Administration reflects a lack of political will to bring the material and intellectual 
authors of labor homicides to justice. 
I 
After both Human Rights Watch issued a reports in November 2008 about the human 
rights situation in Colombia, President Uribe publicly accused José Miguel Vivanco, 
Americas director at Human Rights Watch, of being a "supporter" and an "accomplice" 
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. .10 
 
Military Aid 
 
A US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement should not be considered separately from Plan 
Colombia, the multi-billion dollar US military aid package allocated to Colombia to 
combat narco-trafficking. While indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups are being 
                                                 
7 Human Rights Watch, “Breaking the Grip?,” November, 2008 
8  Human Rights Watch, “Breaking the Grip?,” November, 2008 
9 Statement by José Nirio Sánchez, House Committee on Education and Labor Hearing, February 12, 2009 
10 Amnesty International, “Colombia: Stop false accusations against human rights groups, government 
should address reported abuses,” November 19, 2008 
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displaced by the hundreds of thousands, drug eradication has made little progress under 
the plan. There is substantial evidence to show that the Colombian army has close ties 
with the paramilitaries assaulting trade unionists. General Montoya Uribe, mentioned 
above as being accused of working closely with paramilitaries, was the man responsible 
for managing the hundreds of millions of dollars of US military aid sent to Colombia 
annually. 
 
Pre-Conditions to the Consideration of a Trade Agreement 
 
While much of the debate to date has centered around labor conditionality, Colombia 
raises serious questions as to whether the US can even enter into negotiations over 
conditionality with governments that do not exercise effective control over the country’s 
military and/ or paramilitary or guerilla forces. There is already precedent for 
preconditions concerning labor rights and human rights, reflected in the US trade 
preferences for Africa (Africa Growth and Opportunity Act)  requiring governments to 
demonstrate their ability to implement the rule of law. Similar preconditions must be 
present and integral to any consideration of any Colombia FTA and other future FTAs.   
The US Administration and US Congress should be clear, when such considerations 
cannot be met, that conditionality within the agreement itself will be impossible to 
implement.  
 
A Colombian FTA should only be considered when the Colombian government 
demonstrates a serious political will to sustain reductions in violence and other assaults 
on trade union rights. Only when civilian authorities take serious control of the country 
and paramilitaries, and when the military is stripped of any ability to involve itself in 
labor relations, can Colombia be considered as a trading partner capable of implementing 
labor conditionality.   Reducing union murders alone would not sufficiently address the 
fundamental problem of unchecked paramilitary and military involvement in civil 
society.  
 
Military aid and trade policies must be integrated with a goal to curb paramilitary 
power. The US must become actively engaged in assisting Colombia to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement to the civil war to truly stop the human and labor rights violations 
plaguing that country.  Again, this process must be underway before there is 
consideration of the FTA. 
 
The US must, as Human Rights Watch has urged, investigate the links between US 
companies, major beneficiaries of the agreement, and paramilitaries and punish those 
with such links.11 These same paramilitaries must be probed for what they know about 
recent and current links between the Colombian government/military and the 
paramilitaries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See,  http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/10/16/breaking-grip-0  
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Labor Conditionality  
 
In and of itself, implementation of labor conditionality or labor benchmarks does not  
demonstrate that civilian authorities in Colombia possess sufficient control over military 
and paramilitary forces, over collusion between corporations and paramilitary, or over 
police and judiciary to implement rule of law.  In the event sufficient change on these 
subjects occurs, however, there are still important benchmarks to be met  to demonstrate 
progress on labor rights conditionality. 
 
In order to address Colombia’s systematic labor rights violations, Colombia must honor 
and enforce the recommendations of the ILO for Colombia.  Colombia must grant the 
right to unionize, the right to collectively bargain and the right to strike to public service 
sector workers, temporary workers, contract employees, and workers who are employed 
by worker cooperatives. The right to strike must be granted to employees in "essential 
services" such as the oil and energy sector and Colombia must outlaw direct bargaining 
through “collective pacts” with nonunion employees.  The Colombian government must 
permit industry-wide bargaining and bargaining over pensions and the blacklisting of 
employees involved in unions and strike activity must end. 
 
The ILRF would not consider supporting the passage of the US-Colombia FTA until at a 
minimum, the Colombian government demonstrates a sustained end to military and 
paramilitary violence against unionists and social activists, stronger enforcement of labor 
standards, a stronger labor code and an effective justice system. Even when these 
conditions are met, the concerns and calls for reform from civil society groups in both 
Colombia and the US should be fully considered.  ILRF supports the calls of civil society 
in both countries for further input in, and possible renegotiation of, the agreement in its 
entirety. 
